Though he referred to the events associated with the Black Death as potentially illustrative of his thesis, Langer's unexpected conclusion did not appear to have resulted from any work of his own. In the course of his address Langer acknowledged a major debt to his younger brother, Dr Walter C Langer, a practising psychoanalyst who had written a secret war-time report on Adolf Hitler for the American Office of Strategic Services which anticipates much of what was to be presented as psychohistorical research (Langer 1973) . Walter Langer's study was not to be published for some years, but a few months after his brother's address the publication of Erik Erikson's influential book, 'Young Man Luther' (Erikson 1958) , served to stimulate interest not only in individuals who had made history but also in those who were making or were potentially capable of making history. The psychohistorical bandwagon had begun to roll.
In the election year of 1964 most members of the American Psychiatric Association were presented with a postal invitation to answer a single question: 'Do you believe that Barry Goldwater is psychologically fit to be President of the United States?' This event, while precipitating a storm of protest from the American Psychiatric Association, also focused attention on the possible contributions of psychiatry to contemporary issues. In 1967 the Freud-Bullitt study of Woodrow Wilson, originally prepared in 1919, was at last released for publication (Freud & Bullitt 1967) , and in the same year the Director of the Institute for the Study of National Behavior at Princeton University published a paper in Science on 'Psychiatry and International Affairs', calling for the training of psychiatrists as consultants in the sphere of international relations so as to utilize their supposed expertise (Wedge 1967) . Two years later Erikson produced his study of Gandhi (Erikson 1969) , to be followed by a spate of books and articles on living figures with such titles as 'The Kennedy Neurosis' (Clinch 1973) , 'President Nixon's Psychiatric Profile' (Chesen 1973) , 'Nixon Agonistes' (Wills 1969) , 'Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution' (Lifton 1968) , and 'Stalin as Revolutionary: a Study in History and Personality' (Tucker 1973) .
This intensive activity was accompanied by more academic writings. In 1972 the American Historical Association accepted as members 400 individuals belonging to a Group for the Use of Psychology in History. One year later there was founded a Journal of Psychohistory which, significantly, soon changed its title to History ofChildhood Quarterly. The moving spirit behind this journal, and a vociferous advocate of psychohistory, is Lloyd de Mause, who has attempted to define its scope as follows:
'... history cannot be a science in any strict sense of the term and history can never regard it as part of its task to establish laws. Written history may, in the course of its narrative, use some of the laws established by the various sciences, but its own task remains that of relating the essential sequence of historical action and, qua history, to tell what happened not why.
'Psychohistory ... is on the contrary specifically concerned with establishing laws and discovering causes. The relationship between history and psychohistory is parallel to the relationship between astrology and astronomy, or if that seems too pejorative, between geology and physics.... Psychohistory [is)the science of historical motivation. ' (de Mause 1975a) For de Mause psychohistory is a wholly new discipline, 'less a division of history or psychology than a replacement for sociology, based on a set of problems, a conscious methodology and criteria of excellence all its own' (de Mause 1975b). The contents of a typical issue of the Journal of Psychohistory illustrate the products of this ambitious claim (History of Childhood Quarterly 1975) . The self-explanatory titles of the articles are: (l) Kissinger: a psychohistory. (2) Pedagogy as intrusion: teaching values in popular primary schools in nineteenth century America. (3) Infanticide in the Province of Canterbury during the fifteenth century. (4) Autobiography as a key to identity in the progressive era. (5) Psychohistory and psychotherapy. (6) Psychological analysis and presidential personality: the case of Richard Nixon.
It is natural to cull such illustrations from American sources because the psychohistorical drum has been beaten most loudly in the United States. The reverberations have, of course, been felt elsewhere but the rhythm is essentially the same. Here is an example by one of our own amateur psychohistorians, a prominent politician overheard brooding on the role of the mother of parliaments and her children:
'... our rules are drafted to seek to contain our perversions. The drive of our lust for dominance and power which has brought most of us to our places must be checked if the institution is to survive. The impress of the anal phase, the stage of infantile libidinal development when, accompanied by aggressive phantasies, the child is fascinated by the mastery of his body through sphincter control, is too deeply printed upon our characters. Although most members would fiercelyresist any interpretations which hint at the origins of the nomenclature of our institutions and proceedings, the blunt fact is that we take our seats every day in a chamber where we are continuously passing motions.' (Abse 1974) This, then, indicates the positive side of the picture. As might be expected, it has evoked strong reactions from both the psychiatrists and the historians. The objections raised by the former group have grown since the sharp decline in the reputation of psychoanalysis within the United States during the past decade. Their criticisms have become more strident, and nowhere more strikingly so than in the reception accorded to the Freud-Bullitt study of Woodrow Wilson. Though Freud himself has often been excepted from criticism for even his wildest speculations, this work was singled out for adverse comment and, in the words of a recent official report, 'widely condemned, both by psychiatrists and historians, for its obvious bias, its psychological reductionism, and its failure to give weight to historical and social factors which had a bearing on the subject' (American Psychiatric Association 1976). The report in question carries some weight, emanating as it does from an official task-force on psychohistory convened by the American Psychiatric Association and charged with the task of considering the ethics and scholarship involved in the field. It goes on to identify the "crucial issue as' follows: 'A thornier, more complex, and, in some respects, more disquieting problem has arisen in connection with the recent spate of publications purporting to apply the principles and theoretical constructs of dynamic psychiatry (principally psychoanalytic) to the study of living or very recently deceased persons of wide and usually political significance. A similar problem has arisen with respect to studies of currently existing, politically significant groups.' Tactfully written as it is, the report roundly condemns many of the objectives of psychohistory and its practitioners.
The historians, as is their wont, have been less discreet. They have taken up the challenge with some vigour and, for the most part, with some disdain. Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper, for example, was scarcely able to contain himself in his assessment of Walter Langer's book on Hitler, a topic on which he is an acknowledged authority, when he took the opportunity to deliver a memorable broadside (Trevor-Roper 1973):
' ... Psycho-history', he remarks, 'does not only rest on a defective philosophy, it is also vitiated by a defective method. Instead of proceeding from demonstrable steps, from fact to interpretation, from evidence to conclusion, psycho-historians move in the opposite direction. They deduce their facts from their theories; and this means, in effect, that facts are at the mercy of theory, selected and valued according to their consistence with theory, even invented for the sake of theory. The defect springs, I suggest, from the very nature of psychoanalysis. For psychoanalysis, at best, is a means of therapy, not of investigation. Even if it should cure, it is not thereby shown to be true. It is not a means of establishing fact but a therapeutic myth.' By way of illustration Trevor-Roper singles out the following passage, in which Langer describes how, after completing his work, he visited a female colleague who asked him what he had been able to find out about Hitler's childhood:
'Without attempting to be orderly, I related the material as it came to my mind but omitted any appraisal of its possible significance. She listened intently for a while and then interrupted me saying, "Now I know what his perversion is!" "And", exclaims the doctor, "to my utter amazement, she was right!" i.e. she agreed with him.
'We may note, in this account, that Dr. Hall had not heard a single fact about Hitler's sexual life. Her "far-reaching insight" into his alleged perversion was not based on any empirical or verifiable evidence at all. It was intellectually deduced, by the rules of psychoanalysis, from some casual statements about Hitler's childhood which Dr. Langer had picked up from stale and random gossip repeated fifty years afterwards and thousands of miles away. And yet the agreement of two psychoanalysts interpreting the same rules in the same way made it "right": they "knew".
'I treasure the record of that meeting: it so perfectly illustrates the parallel which I have suggested between psychoanalysts and witch-doctors. I can easily imagine two grave old demonologists chatting comfortably by a porcelain stove in seventeenth-century Wtirttemberg or Bavaria and discussing, over a flagon of Bocksbeuttel, the case of a suspicious old lady in a remote village. On a few scraps of gossip, insignificant to the layman but full of meaning to the expert the furtive comings and goings of a black cat, the wasting away of one of the parson's piglings, an alleged rustle in the chimney-stack -they both reach the same conclusion; and "by God!" exclaims one to the other. slapping his thigh and pouring out another gurgling Pokal, "you're right!'" To date, however, the most searching examination of psychohistory from the historian's standpoint has been made by Professor Jacques Barzun of Columbia University (Barzun 1972) . He reaches a verdict of gross deficiency on the grounds of method and of scholarship. Barzun pins down the essence of the historian's approach to the past, as distinct from that of the sociologist or the psychologist by contrasting three related statements. The sociological statement reads: 'the net effect of his career was destruction, not creation'. The psychological statement reads: 'the mainspring of his character was conquest'. The historical statement reads: 'veni, vidi, vici'. The basic criteria of history, he reminds us, are narrative, chronology, concreteness (of ideas as well as events) and memorability. Like Trevor-Roper, Barzun does not deny the importance of psychology in the march of history: no one familiar with Herodotus, Plutarch, Clarendon, Gibbon or Renan could maintain so absurd a proposition. At the same time, he contests the notion that any particular form of psychological theory could account for historical events in the manner claimed and he levels the following charges against psychohistory and its congeners: 'that they are not new disciplines; that they are not history; that their sense of evidence is weak; that they usurp the name of science as well as of psychology; that human typology and social analogy, even when exact, are not sufficient guides to action; that technical jargon does not add to understanding; that the most innovative psycho-historian needs good histories to help him conceive, define and direct his own work; that the theorists of the new genres should examine and concatenate their thoughts, rather than exhort and rally ...'
On the debit side, therefore, psychohistory cannot be said to have lived up to its own pretensions. To its credit, however, may be attributed one major if unintended achievement, namely to have reawakened interest in the broader links between psychiatry and history, an area of enquiry which has long lain dormant, apart from the flickering interest of individual scholars. This more constructive issue demands some consideration in its own right.
The history of psychiatry is bound up with the development of ideas about the definition, causation and treatment of recognized mental illnesses, along with the careers and contributions of those individuals who have contributed to our understanding of them. However, as Karl Jaspers pointed out more than 60 years ago, inasmuch as these disorders are embedded in a time-bound sociocultural matrix the field of general psychopathology impinges inevitably on the substance of historical study. In Jaspers' own words:
'This knowledge of social grouping is always a necessity for the psychiatrist if he is to understand the patients he" meets in the clinic. But, beyond that, psychopathology has an increasing interest in abnormal psychic phenomena which can be studied only rarely in the clinics or not at all. It enlarges its sources of experience therefore by seeking a knowledge of abnormal psychic events that occur outside the clinics in ordinary life among different social groups and are reflected in human history. This is the final field of investigation for psychopathology.' (Jaspers 1963) In recent years some historians have shown themselves prepared to approach the area of common ground from their own standpoints. The tradition extends from Giovanni Battista Vieo through Jules Michelet to Johann Gottfried Herder and Wilhelm Dilthey who were all in their different ways concerned with the notion of historical consciousness, of man in the setting of his epoch. Leopold von Ranke's traditional academic view was of history as the chronological narrative of events, particularly events concerned with war, politics and diplomacy. Conceived in these terms history became, in Professor E J Hobsbawm's words, 'a deliberately backward discipline' (Hobsbawm 1975) , but it has slowly given ground to the proponents of economic and sociological history and, as Professor Arnaldo Momigliano pointed out in his survey of historiography after Ranke (Momigliano 1966) , it has now been compelled to examine 'the relation between the explanation of historical events and explanation of individual actions'.
. It was the French historian, Lucien Febvre, who first spoke explicitly of histoire psychologique, the study of what he called the histories of mentalite and of sensibilite, which have been defined as '... what was "thinkable" in a human collective at a given moment of time' (Manuel 1971) . In his seminal study, 'Le problerne de l'incroyance au XVIe siecle: la religion de Rabelais', Febvre illustrated what he had in mind. Taking as his subject the mental structure of sixteenth century France, Febvre concentrated on its intellectual content and the modes of its expression, pointing to the various notions then held of the sacred and profane and the part played in their sensibility by hearing and smell rather than visual perception (Febvre 1947). Febvre's approach has since been elaborated with great skill by Robert Mandrou in his 'Introduction to Modern France' where, in a remarkable chapter entitled 'The mind: mental equipment and fundamental attitudes', he explains his guiding principle in these words: 'Just as we could not conceive of studying architecture or the art of weaving in some distant period without first describing the techniques available to the artisan of the time, so we must reconstruct the mental resources at the disposal of professional intellectuals or laymen for analysing, describing and explaining the world, men and God ' (Mandrou .1976 ). This he proceeds to do with much subtlety, paying particular regard to the use of spoken and written language, and contemporary notions of space, time and the natural environment.
The scope of histoire psychologique, however, stops well short of abnormal psychology, individual or social. Even so, as early as 1908, Graham Wallas's prescient study of 'Human Nature in Politics' (Wallas 1948 ) drew attention to the importance of impulse and instinct in public affairs; but for his psychology Wallas turned to William James, Lloyd Morgan and Stanley Hall, apparently subscribing to R G Collingwood's dictum, that 'irrational forces ... the blind forces and activities in us are not parts of the historical process'. An awareness of the importance of these forces for an understanding of historical events, however, was even then in the air. In 1912 Gustave Le Bon attacked the classical approach of contemporary historians to the French Revolution for their neglect of the irrational, claiming that their view 'was simply the result of the habit of having recourse to rational interpretations to explain events dictated by influences ... which were not rational' (Le Bon 1960) . The notion ofcollective irrationality was developed with more precision by the historian Georges Lefebvre in his study of'fa grande peur', the false rumour which spread through France in 1789 about the arrival of brigands, related partly to the false information which was disseminated but also to collective anxiety about hunger, disorder and vagabondage in troubled times. More recently Norman Cohn has written persuasively of the psychology of social movements like millenarianism and antisemitism, attempting to trace their links with shared paranoid fantasies (Cohn 1957) .
In so doing, of course, all these writers are merely reexamining a host of major social phenomena with psychiatric overtones, including magic, superstitious beliefs, miracles, witchcraft, possession, orgiastic cults and, above all, the epidemics of irrational behaviour which have intrigued so many earlier medical observers. Within this framework the psychiatrist, familiar as he is with the range of individual aberration and with what Patrick Grainville has called' ... that particle of madness indispensable to man' may legitimately have a contribution to make. Indeed, in the study of collective psychopathology Rudolf Virchow, who regarded such epidemics as mass-products of sociocultural maladjustment following periods of political and intellectual revolution, went so far as to conclude:
'The history of epidemics is therefore the history of disturbances which civilization has experienced. Its changesshow us with powerfulforce the turning points at whichcivilization moved offin a newdirection. Every true cultural revolution is followed by epidemics ... Psychiatry alone enables the historian to surveyand understand the major fluctuations of public opinion and popular feeling, which on the whole resemble the picture of individual mental illnesses.' (Virchow 1849) What about these individual mental illnesses? In an historical context the psychiatrist is much less likely to be confronted with characters who were demonstrably insane, e.g. George III or Ludwig II, so much as with the type of person whom Sir Harold Wilson, referring to a prominent contemporary African leader, has pithily described as a 'nutter', a term which is more decorously synonymous with particular forms of neurosis and/or personality disorder. Of these people Ernst Kretschmer once observed that psychiatrists often provide court-reports on them when times are peaceful but that they can become our rulers in epochs of turbulence.
In clinical terms, therefore, we know much more about the unsuccessful than about the successful 'nutter' who, if he or she succeeds in making an impact on historical events, is unlikely to come close to detached observation. There are, however, some exceptions, one of the best having been provided by the man who was perhaps the most perceptive of ali participant-observers in modern history, Alexis de Tocqueville. As Foreign Minister in the short-lived French cabinet formed in 1849 after the 'events' of the previous year, he was uniquely placed to study one of the most successful 'nutters' of the era, Louis Napoleon. Here is part of his penetrating description of that archetypal mountebank: 'He [Louis Napoleon]wasvastlysuperior to what his preceding career and his mad enterprisesmight very properly have led one to believe of him. This was my first impression on conversing with him. In this respect he deceived his adversaries, and perhaps still more his friends, if this term can be applied to the politicians who patronized his candidature. The greater part of these, in fact, elected him, not because of his merits, but because of his presumed mediocrity. They expected to find him an instrument which they could handle as they pleased, and which it would always be lawful for them to break when they wished to. In this they were greatly deceived.
'As a private individual, Louis Napoleon possessed certain attractive qualities: an easy and kindly humour, a mind which was gentle, and even tender, without being delicate, great confidence in his intercourse, perfect simplicity, a certain personal modesty amidst the immense pride derived from his origin. He was capable of showing affection, and prone to inspire it in those who approached him. His conversation was brief and unsuggestive. He had not the art of drawing others out or of establishing intimate relations with them; nor any facility in expressing his views. He had the writer's habit, and a certain amount of the author's self-love. His dissimulation, which was the deep dissimulation of a man who has spent his life in plots, was assisted in a remarkable way by the immobility of his features and his want of expression: for his eyes were dull and opaque, like the thick glass used to light the cabins of ships, which admits the light but cannot be seen through. Careless of danger, he possessed a fine, cool courage in days of crisis; and at the same time -a common thing enough -he was very vacillating in his plans. He was often seen to change his direction, to advance, hesitate, draw back, to his great detriment: for the nation had chosen him in order to dare all things, and what it expected from him was audacity and not prudence. It was said that he had always been greatly addicted to pleasures, and not very delicate in his choice of them. This passion for vulgar enjoyment and his taste for luxury had increased still more with the facilities olTered by his position. Each day he wore out his energy in indulgence, and deadened and degraded even his ambition. His intelligence was incoherent, confused, filled with great but ill-assorted thoughts, which he borrowed now from the examples of Napoleon, now from socialistic theories, sometimes from recollections of England, where he had lived: very dilTerent, and often very contrary, sources. These he had laboriously collected in his solitary meditations, far removed from the contact of men and facts, for he was naturally a dreamer and a visionary. But when he was forced to emerge from these vague, vast regions in order to confine his mind to the limits ofa piece of business, it showed itself to be capable of justice, sometimes of subtlety and compass, and even of a certain depth, but never sure, and always prepared to place a grotesque idea by the side of a correct one.
'Generally, it was difficult to come into long and very close contact with him without discovering a little vein of madness running through his better sense, the sight of which always recalled the escapades of his youth, and served to explain them.
'It may be admitted, for that matter, that it was his madness rather than his reason which, thanks to circumstances, caused his success and his force: for the world is a strange theatre. There are moments in it when the worst plays are those which succeed best. If Louis Napoleon had been a wise man, or a man of genius, he would never have become President of the Republic.
'He trusted in his star; he firmly believed himself to be the instrument of destiny and the necessary man. I have always believed that he was really convinced of his right, and I doubt whether Charles X was ever more infatuated with his legitimism than he with his. Moreover, he was quite as incapable of alleging a reason for his faith. Moreover, he desired above all things to meet with devotion to his person and his cause, as though his person and his cause were such as to be able to arouse devotion: merit annoyed him when it displayed ever so little independence. He wanted believers in his star, and vulgar worshippers of his fortune.
'This was the man whom the need of a chief and the power of a memory had placed at the head of France, and with whom we would have to govern. ' (de Tocqueville 1959) 'He trusted in his star.' The very same words are echoed over a century later by another shrewd observer with close access to a major historical figure, who brings us back to our point of departure. 'If', wrote Albert Speer, 'there was any fundamental insanity in Hitler, it was this unshakable belief in his lucky star. He was by nature a religious man, but his capacity for belief had been perverted into belief in himself' (Speer 1971). How much more authority is carried by those two sentences than by all Walter Langer's speculations. And Speer is able to add something more for, unlike the clear-sighted Tocqueville, he became star-struck and later, emerging from his astral nightmare, attempted to analyse his condition in retrospect. What he has to say is of great clinical as well as historical significance: 'I have always thought it was a most valuable trait to recognize reality and not to pursue delusions. But when I now think over my life up to and including the years of imprisonment, there was no period in which I was free of delusory notions. The departure from reality ... was no peculiarity. of the National Socialist regime. But in normal circumstances people who turn their backs on reality are soon set straight by the mockery and criticism of those around them which makes them aware they have lost credibility. In the Third Reich there were no such correctives, especially for those who belonged to the upper stratum. On the contrary, every self-deception was multiplied as in a hall of distorting mirrors, becoming a repeatedly confirmed picture of a fantastical dream world which no longer bore any relationship to the grim outside world. In those mirrors I could see nothing but my own face reproduced many times over. No external factors disturbed the uniformity of hundreds of unchanging faces, all mine.' (Speer 1971) Here, I would suggest, is the pointer to the common ground between Clio, the muse of history, and Psyche, who in classical mythology is depicted as a lovely maiden personifying the soul, often with the wings of a butterfly to signify immortality. In recent years, Clio appears to have been much impressed by the legend of Psyche as the nymph traditionally associated with Cupid or Eros. Psyche today, however, is a polygamous, even a promiscuous, spirit who consorts with Bios, Logos, Eidos and Demos as well as with Eros. Accordingly, the bearing of psychopathology on historical events calls for an altogether more broadly based approach. In the absence of more than a handful of scholars with expertise in more than one discipline a logical course is collaborative enquiry between the historian and the psychiatrist (Hill & Shepherd 1976) .
